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I argue for a pattern theory of self as a usefulway to organize an interdisciplinary approach to
discussions of what constitutes a self. According to the pattern theory, a self is constituted
by a number of characteristic features or aspects that may includeminimal embodied, mini-
mal experiential, affective, intersubjective, psychological/cognitive, narrative, extended, and
situated aspects. A pattern theory of self helps to clarify various interpretations of self as
compatible or commensurable instead of thinking them in opposition, and it helps to show
how various aspects of self may be related across certain dimensions. I also suggest that
a pattern theory of self can help to adjudicate (or at least map the differences) between the
idea that the self correlates to self-referential processing in the cortical midline structures
of the brain and other narrower or wider conceptions of self.
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INTRODUCTION: VARIATIONS ON THE SELF
From a philosophical perspective, any claim to explain something
called “the self” immediately raises a host of problems. On the
one hand, although many philosophers are perfectly comfortable
talking about “the self,” what they have to say about this con-
cept usually turns out to be controversial. For example, that the
self is socially constructed (Gergen, 2011) or a product of narra-
tive (Schechtman, 2011), and nothing more; that the self is strictly
minimal, on the order of 3 s in duration, and nothing more (Straw-
son, 1999a); that the self as such doesn’t exist at all, plus a lot
more about a replacement concept called a “self model” (Met-
zinger, 2003). Such deflationary and reductionist accounts tend to
be reactions against something like a traditional Cartesian notion
of the self as a substantial (soul-like) entity, and some of them
can be understood as variously inspired by Humean, Buddhist, or
neuroscientific perspectives.
On the other hand, and pursuing a different strategy, some
philosophers prefer to avoid the phrase “the self” by pluralizing
it with important modifiers between “the” and “self.” Thus we
find a multitude of variations, once cataloged, with references, by
Strawson (1999b) as follows:
[T]he cognitive self, the conceptual self, the contextualized
self, the core self, the dialogic self, the ecological self, the
embodied self, the emergent self, the empirical self, the exis-
tential self, the extended self, the fictional self, the full-grown
self, the interpersonal self, the material self, the narrative self,
the philosophical self, the physical self, the private self, the
representational self, the rock bottom essential self, the semi-
otic self, the social self, the transparent self, and the verbal
self (cf. e.g., James, 1890; Stern, 1985; Dennett, 1991; Gibson,
1993; Neisser, 1994; Cole, 1997; Butterworth, 1998; Gaz-
zaniga, 1998; Legerstee, 1998; Gallagher and Marcel, 1999;
Pickering, 1999; Sheets-Johnstone, 1999).
Trying to improve on this list would likely lead to nitpicking about
terms, but we may want to add “the neural self,”“the synaptic self”
(LeDoux, 2002); or what we might call “the midline self” [in refer-
ence to self-referential processes in the cortical midline structures
(CMS) (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004)]. The list of variations is
likely not complete. Someone might think that the question is:
“Which is it?” – which one is the self? Or perhaps, which one is
the primary meaning of self? It’s not clear, however, that one has
to choose just one variation. Many of these concepts of self were
developed in the plural. James (1890), for example, distinguished
between the physical self, the social self, and the private self. Neisser
(1988) discussed five types of self-knowledge corresponding to
the ecological self, the interpersonal self, the conceptual self, the
extended self, and the private self. Despite the terminology sug-
gesting a plurality of selves, however, Neisser (1991) carefully refers
to them as aspects of self – e.g., the ecological aspect of self.
In this paper I propose to stay plural about the concept of self,
and to follow Neisser’s more careful vocabulary referencing dif-
ferent aspects of self. In this regard, however, I want to argue that
we should not think of such aspects as aspects of “the self,” as if
they are simply modifying something that has its own independent
existence. Rather, I propose that we think of these aspects as orga-
nized in certain patterns, and that a particular variation of such a
pattern constitutes what we call a self. In the following sections I’ll
try to make this idea clear, and I’ll try to indicate some advantages
of thinking of self in this way.
In part, this approach is motivated by various issues that relate
to the theory of self as involving CMS and self-referential process-
ing, as developed by Northoff and others (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004; Northoff et al., 2006). Some critical studies, for example,
have suggested that in terms of brain processes, the self is both
everywhere and nowhere in the brain (Gillihan and Farah, 2005;
Vogeley and Gallagher, 2011). Others challenge the idea that the
self correlates to CMS processing, and argue that such processes are
not self-specific because activation in these areas also corresponds
to non-self discrimination (Legrand and Ruby, 2009). Although I
think some of these criticisms raise important points, I argue here
that midline processes do tell us something important about the
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notion of self and may correlate with specific aspects that are part
of the pattern that we call self.
PATTERN THEORIES
Let me first say that in talking about pattern theories I do not
mean to associate a pattern theory of self with “Pattern Theory”
in mathematics (Grenanderm, 1994). This kind of mathematical
formalism may or may not be a helpful tool for the analysis of the
specific patterns that I will discuss. I remain neutral on that point.
In any case, one can understand the notion of pattern at stake here
without having to understand Pattern Theory in this sense. Fur-
thermore, although there are numerous theories that are referred
to as “pattern theories,” e.g., pattern theory of pain (Goldscheider,
1894; Sinclair, 1955), dynamic pattern theory of motor control
(Kelso, 1995), etc. these theories don’t necessarily share the same
general principles, and at the most general level the concepts of
pattern represented in the different theories may be incommensu-
rable with each other. Accordingly, since, for purposes of economy
I want to avoid starting from scratch in developing a pattern theory
of self, I will follow a strategy that allows me to point to an already
established theory, one that can operate as a heuristic model for
our purposes – i.e., one in which the concept of pattern is used in a
way that is not incommensurable with what I take to be the pattern
theory of self. Although we could think of psychological discus-
sions of pattern recognition as a kindred notion, more specifically
I suggest that we consider what I’ll call a pattern theory of emo-
tion to be a good model for a pattern theory of self. There are two
reasons why a pattern theory of emotion may be a good model
in this regard: (1) it reflects a commensurable concept of pattern
(i.e., it refers to the same kind of pattern that I think is relevant to
the notion of self, and (2) it may contribute directly to a pattern
theory of self since, as I’ll suggest, affect is one aspect that forms
part of the pattern of self.
The pattern theory of emotion claims that emotions are com-
plex patterns of bodily processes, experiences, expressions, behav-
iors and actions, and as such they are “individuated in patterns of
characteristic features” (Izard, 1972; Izard et al., 2000; Mendoça,
2012; Newen et al., under review). On a pattern theory, “emotion”
is a cluster concept that includes a sufficient number of charac-
teristic features. Taken together, a certain pattern of characteristic
features constitutes an emotion, although no individual feature
by itself may be necessary to constitute an emotion. This means,
as Newen et al. (under review) point out, there are borderline
cases where it is not clear whether some complex cluster of aspects
counts as an emotion.
Izard et al. (2000) develop this idea under the title of differen-
tial emotions theory (DET), maintaining that emotions operate
as complex systems that emerge from dynamic interactions of
constituent neuro-hormonal, motoric, and experiential processes
(Izard, 1972). Emotion patterns draw from components that are
set up as evolutionary adaptations. In the emergence of any partic-
ular emotion, however, organism-environment transactions play
a role. Individual emotions may also combine or co-assemble with
other emotions to form new emotion patterns that may stabilize
over repeating occurrences. On this view, discrete emotions are
dynamically self-organizing in that “recursive interactions among
component processes generate emergent properties” (Izard et al.,
2000, p. 15). Different emotions are constituted by different pat-
terns of processes that yield behavioral performances that vary
from one individual to another, and within individuals over time.
Importantly, such behaviors should not be regarded simply as an
expression of an emotion, but rather are part (an emerging feature)
of the pattern that constitutes the emotion.
Newen et al. (under review) provide a catalog of different
features that may contribute to specific patterns that constitute
emotions. They include:
(1) Autonomic processes: one might think of James’ (1884) claim
that an emotion is the perception of bodily changes that
include autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity. For a pat-
tern theory of emotion autonomic activity is only one possible
constituent, and it may be perceived (experienced) or not.
Not every emotion has a distinct ANS pattern, and different
emotions need not have different ANS patterns (Prinz, 2004).
(2) Actions: including what Frijda calls “action tendencies,” bod-
ily changes preparatory for actions that may be experienced as
urges to perform a certain kind of action (Frijda, 1986). Some
emotions, e.g., happiness, may not include this component;
others may be typically associated with specific actions (e.g.,
freezing or fleeing in fear).
(3) Overt expressions: including expressive posture and move-
ment, facial expression, gesture, and vocal expressions (e.g.,
intonations, screams, laughter). Such individual expressions
may themselves combine into a typical emotion-related
pattern themselves.
(4) Phenomenal feeling: this conscious or experiential compo-
nent is often part of an emotion, although it is not necessary
for every emotional occurrence. In some rare cases typical
physiological, expressive, and cognitive aspects may be present
without the phenomenal aspect (e.g., in those disposed to
repress fear (Sparks et al., 1999).
(5) Cognitive aspects: such as attitudes, shifts of attention, and
changes to perception. Cognitive attitudes may include, for
example, as Newen et al. suggest, belittling thoughts about
one’s rival in the case of jealousy or a judgment that one has
been treated unfairly in certain cases of anger. Such attitudes
may or may not be manifested in behavior or in verbal reports.
Shifts of attention, may include, for example, being alerted to
specific aspects of the environment in the case of fear. Affect
is an essential aspect of perception (Bower and Gallagher, in
press) and emotions can make us notice things we otherwise
would not have noticed or can motivate us to see things a
certain way.
(6) Intentional objects: that is, the perceived, remembered or
imagined object the emotion is about. Newen et al. quote
(Goldie, 2000, pp. 16–17). “This can be a particular thing or
person (that pudding, this man), an event or an action (the
earthquake, your hitting me), or a state of affairs (my being in
an aeroplane).”
I would add to this list:
(7) Situational aspects: following Dewey, who, in his critique of
James, points out that emotions are not reducible to a set of
bodily states, but also, since the body is always coupled to an
environment, always include situational aspects. The unit of
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analysis should always be organism-environment. Situational
aspects, and the fact that emotional experiences and behaviors
are always situated, are part of the pattern (Mendoça, 2012,
2013). In this regard it is not just the intentional object, but
also the situation reflected in the intentional structure of the
emotion, that helps to disambiguate emotional expressions.
Importantly, situations are almost always social and/or cul-
tural and such factors contribute constitutively to what an
emotion is.
Such aspects are variables that can take different values and weights
in the dynamic constitution of an emotion. Some values are more
or less likely to occur together. In this respect we can distinguish
typical patterns of aspects and values and define an emotion as
involving some variation of that pattern. Newen et al. are careful
to note that to say a particular feature is constitutive of an emotion
does not mean that it is an essential component. On the pattern
theory of emotion such features are not constitutive in the essen-
tialist sense. One can have a token of the same type of emotion
lacking a particular characteristic feature, although there may be
some minimal number of characteristic features and their values
that are sufficient to constitute a particular pattern that counts as
that emotion.
A feature f is constitutive for a pattern X if it is part of at least
one set of features which is minimally sufficient for a token
to belong to a type X. “Minimally sufficient” means that these
features are jointly sufficient for the episode to be of type X,
but if one of them would be taken away the episode would not
count as a instance of type X anymore (Newen et al., under
review).
It is possible,of course, to include other aspects or characteristics in
the list above. One may want to include more than just autonomic
processes under a broad heading of embodied processes, for exam-
ple. One may want to list certain brain patterns as part of an emo-
tion pattern. I think, however, that the list provides sufficient detail
to indicate the kind of pattern theory that we want to consider. Let
me just note that one of the advantages of this theory of emotion
is that it becomes very easy to say that we can perceive emotions
in others. If emotions are constituted by features that may include
bodily expressions, behaviors, action expressions, etc., then emo-
tion perception can be considered a form of pattern recognition
(Newen et al., under review; Gallagher and Varga, in press).
A PATTERN THEORY OF SELF
In a way similar to the construction of a pattern theory of emotion,
I want to suggest that we can develop a pattern theory of self. On
such a view, what we call self consists of a complex and sufficient
pattern of certain contributories, none of which on their own is
necessary or essential to any particular self. This is not a pattern
theory of “the self.” Rather, what we call “self” is a cluster con-
cept which includes a sufficient number of characteristic features.
Taken together, a certain pattern of characteristic features consti-
tute an individual self. It seems possible that this would allow us to
identify borderline cases where it is not clear whether some com-
plex cluster of aspects would count as a self – here one might think
of Dissociative Identity Disorder and the idea that there may be
more than one self involved in such cases. On this view selves oper-
ate as complex systems that emerge from dynamic interactions of
constituent aspects. It may also be the case that self-patterns draw
from components that, like the components of emotion, are set
up as evolutionary adaptations. Indeed, emotion-related aspects
may contribute to the constitution of a self1. Different selves are
constituted by different patterns, but within one individual these
patterns may change over time.
One important issue concerns the level of analysis at which we
put the pattern theory of self to work. There are three possible
levels to think about. First, one can think of the pattern theory of
self as operating like a meta-theory that defines a schema of possi-
ble theories of self, each of which would itself be a pattern theory.
For example, the meta-theory can claim that elements a through
g are all possible aspects that can be included in any particular
pattern theory of self. Such a meta-theory would aim to provide a
complete list of such elements and to map out all possible pattern
theories of self. Accordingly, at this level there would be no claims
made about necessary or sufficient conditions for constituting a
self. Second, however, any particular theory of self can be a pat-
tern theory, and one pattern theory can differ from another pattern
theory by specifying different aspects (from among a through g )
to be included as aspects of self. In this respect, one can think of
a pattern theory of self as defining the self at the level of a type,
and at this level the theory might specify necessary or sufficient
conditions, indicating, for example, that a and b are necessary but
not sufficient for selfhood. Finally, however, one can think that in
any particular instance, at the level of a particular token, a pattern
theory of self can apply to an individual self. A particular self may
manifest or include a pattern of only aspects a through d and be
considered a self even if all aspects defined by the relevant pattern
theory of self are not included. The analysis in this paper remains
on the meta-theoretical level unless otherwise noted.
What features can contribute to specific patterns that consti-
tute a self? To philosophers it will come as no surprise that what
gets included in this list is open to contentious debate. Keep in
mind, however, that, remaining at the level of meta-theory, we are
not talking about necessary conditions. A particular theory of self
may exclude some of these conditions, and a particular self may
lack a particular characteristic feature as defined here and still be
considered a self. Here is a tentative list. I do not claim that it is
complete. Under each heading I offer some un-systematic notes to
indicate the scope of each aspect (or set of aspects).
(1) Minimal embodied aspects: include here core biological, eco-
logical aspects, which allow the system to distinguish between
itself and what is not itself. This is an extremely basic aspect
of all kinds of animal behavior. One should also include
those aspects that define the egocentric (body-centered) spa-
tial frame of reference, which reflects a first-person perspec-
tive, and contributes to specifications of possible actions in
peripersonal space.
(2) Minimal experiential aspects: to the extent that the bodily sys-
tem can be conscious, it will pre-reflectively experience, from
1In this respect we may start to think of the self as a meta-pattern of various
constituent patterns or sets of patterns.
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a first-person perspective, the self/non-self distinction in the
various sensory-motor modalities available to it (e.g., kines-
thesia, proprioception, touch, vision). Such aspects contribute
to an experiential and embodied sense of ownership (the
“mineness” of one’s experience, as well as of one’s body and
movement), and a sense of agency for one’s actions (Gallagher,
2000, 2012a; Rochat, 2011).
(3) Affective aspects: the fact that someone manifests a certain
temperament may reflect a particular mix of affective factors
that range from very basic and mostly covert or tacit bodily
affects to what may be for her a typical emotional pattern or
mood, For example, someone may be a typical extrovert who
enthusiastically engages in outwardly directed actions.
(4) Intersubjective aspects: human and possibly some non-
human animals are born with a capacity for attuning to
intersubjective existence (Neisser, 1988); this may take the
form of being aware that someone else is present and possibly
gazing at you. Human infants attend to the gaze and the eye
direction of others. There is a certain point in such situations
where a more developed self-consciousness arises – a sense
of self-for-others (Sartre, 1956); a self-conscious recognition
of oneself as being oneself as distinct from others. This is
sometimes associated with mirror self-recognition (see Gallup
et al., 2011). Mead (1913) famously suggested that the self (in
this developed sense) originates in such intersubjective/social
interactions. Others suggest that in those systems capable of
language, this intersubjective aspect is internalized and takes
the form of a dialogical process which helps to constitute the
self (see Hermans, 2011).
(5) Psychological/cognitive aspects: traditional theories of the self
focus on these aspects, which may range from explicit self-
consciousness to conceptual understanding of self as self, to
personality traits of which one may not be self-conscious at
all. In addition, there are strong arguments for psychological
continuity and the importance of memory in the literature on
personal identity (e.g., Shoemaker, 2011). Most often philoso-
phers think of these aspects as part of a private, internal kind
of existence; neuroscientists may characterize these aspects
in terms of neuronal processes. One might also include rep-
resentational aspects here, where this means something like
one’s ability to represent oneself as oneself (to oneself, but
also perhaps to others).
(6) Narrative aspects: although there are many variations of this
idea, the basic claim is that selves are inherently narrative enti-
ties (Schechtman, 2011), and for some theorists, narratives are
constitutive for selves. Our self-interpretations have a narra-
tive structure. On some views it is important that narratives
are generated by the brain, a fact that leads some to consider
narratives mostly as fictions (Gazzaniga, 1998) and selves as
abstract “centers of narrative gravity” (Dennett, 1991).
(7) Extended aspects: James (1890) suggested that what we call
self may include physical pieces of property, such as clothes,
homes, and various things that we own. We identify ourselves
with stuff we own, and perhaps with the technologies we use,
the institutions we work in, or the nation states that we inhabit.
(8) Situated aspects: these are aspects that play some (major or
minor) role in shaping who we are. They include the kind of
family structure and environment where we grew up; cultural
and normative practices that define our way of living, and so
on (see Gergen, 2011).
Such aspects are variables that can take different values and weights
in the dynamic constitution of a self. This pattern theory of self
will not solve all philosophical problems of course. One may want
to know which of these aspects are necessary or essential, and this
might be specified by a particular pattern theory of self. As such
theories get applied to individuals, for example, it seems possible
that one may experience life in a less continuous or coherent way
than others do, thereby minimizing the narrative aspect, without
minimizing the sense of self or self-identity (Strawson, 2004). One
may also lose a sense of agency, as in some schizophrenic symp-
toms, without losing a sense of ownership or other aspects that
define a self (Gallagher, 2005). One might lose the ability to recall
one’s past life, as in some cases of amnesia and Alzheimer’s disease,
and may also undergo character or personality change; in such
cases one’s self-identity may continue to be supported by one’s
minimal bodily and experiential aspects, as well as by intersubjec-
tive relations and/or extended aspects in one’s surroundings. This
is not to say that such changes do not result in a modulation of self-
experience or self-identity, but rather, since self is not reducible to
any one of these aspects, it is a modulation rather than a complete
loss. There may be various states of existence or pathologies asso-
ciated with each of these aspects such that the aspect in question
is eliminated or seriously modified.
On the one hand, we can think of a particular pattern theory
of self where no one feature is constitutive in an essentialist sense.
If someone lacks memory or a sense of agency, or perhaps lacks
both, she continues as a self if there are a sufficient number of
aspects still intact. On the other hand, we can think of a different
particular pattern theory of self where certain aspects are defined
as necessary. Beyond such differences, there are still a number of
questions outstanding for any particular pattern theory of self. Is
there some minimal number of aspects, or some specific com-
binations of aspects sufficient to constitute a particular pattern
that counts as self? Is there a hierarchical relation among these
aspects? For example, if someone lacked certain minimal experi-
ential aspects, would their lives still reflect a narrative structure?
Different answers to these questions define different variations of
a pattern theory of self. It would be difficult to talk of a pattern,
or a self, however, if only one aspect is claimed as necessary and
sufficient for selfhood. Indeed, if that were the claim, the “aspect”
would no longer be an aspect (of a self, or of a pattern); it would
be the self. The pattern theory of self rules out this kind of reduc-
tion, a priori, although it does not rule out various answers to the
questions mentioned above. At the level of the meta-theory one
can also ask: how many different patterns are viable?
SOME BENEFITS OF A PATTERN THEORY OF SELF AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO CMS PROCESSES
One benefit of the pattern theory of self is that we can more clearly
understand various interpretations of self as compatible or com-
mensurable instead of thinking them in opposition. For example,
different definitions of personhood can be accommodated or can
be viewed as different interpretations that place different weights
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on some aspects rather than others. If with Locke we define person
to mean “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflec-
tion, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in
different times and places; which it does only by that conscious-
ness with is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me,
essential to it . . .” (Locke, 1690/1979, 318), then we can see clearly
that this notion of person focuses on psychological aspects of self
and ignores other aspects. Other definitions of personhood may
emphasize bodily continuity, the importance of social role or legal
standing. Differences in definitions of personhood, however, do
not necessarily imply differences in definition of self. We may dis-
agree about where to lay the emphasis in defining personhood,
but continue to agree that a self is composed of some pattern
of aspects, some of which are relevant to the notion of person-
hood, and others which are not. When we focus on or emphasize
a certain pattern or organization of aspects from a certain van-
tage point (an interpretation which may be tied to social roles,
or to causal, legal or moral responsibility, to or certain cultural
practices, etc.), we can easily understand self to accommodate dif-
ferent concepts of person, or moral agent, or experiential subject,
or physical individual, or mental entity, etc. The pattern theory
of self, at the meta-level, remains neutral with respect to these
interpretations, and in some respects defines the field of reference
or common ground on which such debates about personhood or
moral agency or other interpretations of self can take place.
Another advantage is that the pattern theory helps us to see
that the various aspects of self may be related in important ways.
Many of the particular elements included in the various aspects
are themselves complex features of existence that may not be con-
ceptually bound to just one aspect. Thus, for example, the sense
of agency in some basic way may be tied to motor control and
the sensory-motor operations of the body, but it is also related
to social and cultural norms and expectations (which may place
limitations on agency) and to psychological/cognitive processes of
deliberation and decision-making (Gallagher, 2012a). Something
like the sense of agency is interwoven into several aspects of self.
To the extent that something like this applies to other elements,
then it will be difficult to make the case that there is one and only
one aspect that defines self in all cases.
It is in this respect that the pattern theory of self may help
to make sense out of some of the controversies surrounding the
notion that self is related to cortical midline regions. One claim
made in connection with what I’ll call the midline theory of self
(or for short, the midline self) is that there is a common ele-
ment that unites different aspects of self, an integrative glue that
holds the pattern together, and that this common element is a
processing of stimuli as self-referential (Northoff et al., 2006). The
notion of self-referential is then defined in terms of pre-reflective
experience, which is found across a diversity of contexts, “auto-
biographical, social, spatial,” and various others. It is also noted
that in any particular case pre-reflective self-referential experi-
ence has an affective or emotional dimension. In these regards
the notion of self-referential experience includes a number of
aspects that can be accommodated by the pattern theory of self.
One problem that arises, however, is that pre-reflective experience
is extremely difficult to operationalize in experimental settings.
Thus Northoff et al. (2006) in discussing experimental data shift
the focus to processes that involve reflection or judgment, such as
a trait adjective judgment task. For example, in a study by Kelley
et al. (2002) subjects are asked to judge whether trait adjectives
(e.g.,“polite”) more closely described “the participants themselves
(self-referential), the current U.S. President (other-referential), or
a given case (case-referential)” (Northoff et al., 2006, p. 441).
Such experiments activate a variety of brain areas – medial cortex,
ventro-, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, lateral parietal cortex,
bilateral temporal poles, insula, and subcortical regions, including
brain stem, colliculi, periaqueductal gray (PAG), and hypothala-
mus/hypophysis (Northoff et al., 2006, p. 441). Northoff argues
that based on a review of recent brain-imaging studies, there are
certain core areas commonly activated for self-referential behavior,
the so-called CMS. The studies reviewed, however, included only
those comparing self- and non-self-related tasks – that is, tasks
where subjects had to discriminate between self and non-self – a
point that motivated the critique by Legrand and Ruby.
Legrand and Ruby (2009) suggested that there are cognitive
processes common to all of the tasks involved in the Northoff et
al. review, namely a reflective process of differentiating self and
non-self and often involving non-domain specific inferential pro-
cessing and memory recall. This means that the activated CMS are
not dedicated exclusively to self since processes related to non-self,
and often to other persons are involved. Indeed, Legrand and Ruby
demonstrate “that the main brain regions recruited for others’
mind representation are also and precisely the main brain regions
reported in self studies and that this overlap extends beyond the
brain areas usually pointed out . . .” (p. 254). The self-referential
processes at stake in these studies are not self-specific in the tech-
nical sense proposed by Legrand and Ruby as being (1) exclusively
about self (and not about non-self) and (2) non-contingently
(i.e., necessary for the process to be) about self. They suggest that
only one thing actually meets the self-specificity requirements: the
first-person perspectival nature of experience. First-person per-
spective is exclusively self-related (since it does not apply to the
non-self) and non-contingent (since changing or losing the first-
person perspective amounts to changing or losing the self–non-self
distinction).
On the one hand, Legrand and Ruby want to specify one nec-
essary condition of selfhood; on the other hand, this does not rule
out that there are other relevant aspects of self that are important:
“We do not claim that all there is to the self can be subsumed
under a single process but propose that both basic and complex
forms of self have to rely at least partly on self-specific processes
. . .” (2009, p. 279). Whether or not first-person perspective is a
necessary condition of selfhood (see, Gallagher, 2012b for a posi-
tive answer in agreement with Legrand and Ruby), the disclaimer
about subsuming self under a single process is important.
The important move here is to admit that there are multiple
processes that may count as self-related, even if not self-specific,
and that they can be constitutive of self over and above first-person
perspective. That sends us back to a pluralist approach, and it also
opens up a theoretical space for the idea that processes associated
with CMS, among other aspects, are relevant to what we call self.
Indeed, Northoff et al. (2006) (also Northoff et al., 2011; Qin and
Northoff, 2011) point to multiple processes that contribute to dif-
ferent aspects of self. These are processes in the verbal domain (as
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in trait adjective judgment tasks), spatial domain (egocentric vs.
allocentric); memory domain (in relation to self-referential infor-
mation); emotional domain (self-related vs. non-self-related);
facial recognition domain (self vs. non-self); social domain (where,
according to Northoff et al.’s simulation theory approach, under-
standing of others depends on self-simulations); and domains that
involve agency and ownership. All of these domains have a place
within the pattern theory of self. Processes that pertain to mem-
ory and face recognition are clearly part of what we referred to
as psychological/cognitive aspects. Those that pertain to language
(verbal domain) may also be cognitive or may include narrative
aspects. Processes pertaining to the emotional domain belong to
affective aspects; those that pertain to spatial domain are closely
related to first-person perspective, but nicely fit with minimal
embodied aspects, while those that pertain to agency and own-
ership are part of the minimal experiential aspects. Social domain
processes are clearly part of the intersubjective aspects. More gen-
erally, given that all of these processes reflect a self/non-self matrix,
they demonstrate how the minimal embodied aspect of self/non-
self differentiation is interwoven into the various other aspects of
self. It has also been suggested, however, that minimal experiential
aspects of self, connected with basic self-awareness, are interwo-
ven with all other aspects of self, and moreover, that this minimal
self-referential awareness survives damage to critical areas in the
CMS (Philippi et al., 2012).
Accordingly, the concept of a midline self points to a specific
pattern that includes a significant set of interconnected aspects, but
not all of the aspects identified in the previous section. The midline
theory of self is one particular pattern theory of self. Whether
the aspects reflected in self-referential processing in CMS consti-
tute “the core of our self,” as Northoff et al. claim, is of course
open to debate. One could go more minimal and claim that the
core is, as Legrand and Ruby suggest, a very minimal embodied
aspect, or go wider to include aspects that may go beyond CMS
related processes, such as extended and situated aspects, or very
basic aspects of self-awareness that survive damage to CMS areas
(Philippi et al., 2012).
That extended and situated aspects, as well as other aspects
included in a pattern theory of self, may enter into a defini-
tion of self also suggests an important proviso on the type of
approach taken by researchers who are looking specifically at
neural processes that reflect these different self-referential behav-
iors. The patterns at stake in a pattern theory of self are not
reducible to neuronal patterns, or patterns of brain activation.
This is the case not only for extended and situated aspects, but
also for aspects that relate to one’s body, emotional, and inter-
subjective life, cognitive and narrative dimensions, and so forth.
In each case more factors than just brain processes are involved.
Although we can expect that brain processes will in some way
reflect the way a self is constituted across these different factors,
who we are, or what self is, is more than the brain. In this respect,
and at the very least, the pattern theory of self helps to map out
more precisely what the possibilities are for a non-reductionist,
non-deflationary theory of self that is also not inflated into a tra-
ditional Cartesian theory of the self as a substantial (soul-like)
entity.
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